In December 2024, Diplomats Without Borders (DWB) and the Centre for Dialogue and Global Affairs (CDGA) initiated a conversation on Myanmar with a group of Chinese scholars gathered under the auspices of Peking University. A follow-up discussion was held in June 2026 after the national elections held in Myanmar earlier in the year.
The aim of these conversations was to obtain a better understanding of the complexities and dynamics of the conflicts afflicting Myanmar. The causes of these conflicts reach back centuries, some forged by imperial conquest, colonial ambitions and economic rivalries, all of which bequeathed to the contemporary state a contentious mosaic of ethnic affiliations, cultural traditions and religious faiths. In the years since Myanmar (then called Burma) became an independent sovereign state in 1948, the country has experienced episodes of democratic governance but also extended periods of military rule and an array of armed insurgencies led by various ethnic armed groups (EROs) contesting the central government. Another military takeover in 2021 triggered an expanded armed insurgency extending beyond the ethnic homelands into the heartland of Myanmar, closer to major population centres.
The discussants recognise that the responsibility for the prevention and resolution of violent conflict within states lies first and foremost with domestic institutions and actors. They must make the critical choices and take the difficult decisions that will eventually open the pathways to peace. Nevertheless, the impact of protracted armed conflicts within states rarely remains exclusively within the borders of those states. Neighbouring countries, regional organisations and the international community more broadly are likely to become involved in some fashion because of the cross-border security threats, humanitarian concerns and economic repercussions that often result from civil wars.
The DWB, CDGA and Peking University will also publish a summary of future discussions, which we hope will be of interest to institutions and individuals concerned about the future of Myanmar and its people. These discussions do not represent the official positions of those organisations nor are they intended to be prescriptive. They serve simply as a point of departure for a continuing dialogue on the crisis in Myanmar and its diplomatic and humanitarian implications. Any comments are welcome to be sent to info@cdga.org.uk.
August 2026
Is Peace Possible? Pathways to Conflict Resolution in Myanmar
Discussion Summary
Date: 10 December 2024
Location: Zoom
DWB Participants
Alan Doss (former Under Secretary General of the UN and President of Kofi Annan Foundation; convenor Myanmar Interest Group at DWB; former Chair of the CDGA Advisory Board)
Clem McCartney (Chair of Conflict Resolution Working Group at DWB)
Gautam Mukhopadhaya (former Indian Ambassador to Myanmar; member of the Myanmar Interest Group at DWB)
CDGA (then OXGS) Participants
Denis Galligan (Emeritus Professor of Social-Legal Studies, University of Oxford; CDGA Co-Director)
Paul Dziatkowiec (Director of Mediation and Peace Support, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; former Australian diplomat; Fellow at CDGA and member at DWB)
Brian Wong (Assistant Professor at HKU; Fellow at CDGA)
The Mainland Chinese Perspective
Myanmar’s situation is worsening rapidly, but there are no robust proposals to address the crisis effectively. US engagement is limited, as there is a decline in American academics’ interest in Myanmar compared to a decade ago. ASEAN, despite being directly involved, has struggled to provide meaningful solutions due to issues such as structural limitations and leadership challenges within the bloc. That said, Malaysia has potential to play a more constructive role during its ASEAN chairmanship in 2025. There is a need for greater involvement from the global community and non-governmental organisations, as governmental players seem uninterested or ineffective. More specifically, academia, including institutions like Peking University, and diplomatic organisations such as DWB, should take the initiative to propose solutions, fostering a more open exchange among scholars and diplomats (particularly those from China) wherein participants can engage with the ideas and practices from other countries, and leveraging their networks and expertise to address Myanmar’s pressing challenges.
There is also a need for both internal and international inclusivity to achieve peace and stability in Myanmar. Internally, Myanmar lacks consensus on its political and military frameworks, leading to ongoing disputes and even military conflicts among various stakeholders, including the current government, the military, ethnic armed groups, the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), and the opposition shadow government. Without an inclusive framework, any steps toward reconciliation or elections remain difficult. While Myanmar’s situation has been internationalised, involving actors like the UN, the US, China, India, Japan, and Russia, these interested parties hold differing views and interests, with some aiming to support an inclusive framework and others seeking to change the current military government. The involvement of both constructive and non-constructive international entities complicates the situation further, and calls for a collaborative international effort, particularly from major players like China and the EU, to support Myanmar in building an inclusive political and military framework. While this is a difficult task, incremental, constructive actions by both domestic and international parties are necessary to pave the way for peace, stability, and eventually a relatively inclusive election.
Myanmar’s political crisis was cause for further concern. The Myanmar government faces great difficulties, especially considering the increasing territorial control by opposition groups like the National Unity Government (NUG), the PDF, and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). These groups, active in regions like Magway, Sagaing, Rakhine, and Kachin States, have made notable advances, undermining the military’s dominance. Myanmar’s long-standing ethnic divisions and Burman nationalism also pose challenges and require patience and goodwill in conflict resolution. Reconciliation could be fostered through peaceful negotiations involving all stakeholders, including ethnic minorities and the Burman majority. In the short term, a general election using a proportional representation (PR) system could address political stalemates. Collaboration between ASEAN, China, and India is also crucial, with ‘silent diplomacy’ possibly encouraging dialogue between Myanmar’s military and opposition. In the long run, constitutional revisions are critical for achieving sustainable peace and addressing the country’s historical grievances.
China, for its part, is committed to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and non-interference in Myanmar’s affairs, while maintaining cooperation to combat cross-border crimes, such as online gambling and fraud, which could threaten China’s interests. China supports Myanmar’s sovereignty and the objective of moving towards elections and peace, and is opposed to external interference or chaos in Myanmar. Economic cooperation is a practical focus amid political complexities, given the importance of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and the operation of oil and gas pipelines. China’s engagement in Myanmar can be categorised into policy, academic, and social circles, although the sensitivity and volatility of Myanmar-related issues pose several challenges. For example, academic and policy discussions in China on Myanmar are declining, reflecting the topic’s complexity. Similarly, the situation in northern Myanmar, exacerbated by multiple stakeholders and conflicts, has become increasingly complicated. China should avoid deeper entanglement to prevent falling into ‘obvious traps’. Indeed, resolving the crisis requires all stakeholders to cease negative competition, without which China’s efforts could be ineffective or counterproductive.
Finally, as the Myanmar crisis grows more complex, there are rising humanitarian needs amidst evolving security issues. There is a global dilution of focus on Myanmar due to competing crises, such as in Yemen and Ukraine, which has led to reduced international humanitarian aid, including from the UN and the US. This could be termed a ‘humanitarian deficit’ in Myanmar. The forthcoming elections come with significant challenges, including persistent security issues. While conflicts in northern Myanmar have somewhat de-escalated, tensions in Rakhine State continue to escalate, with the Arakan Army seizing key areas, such as Maungdaw Township, formerly under the control of the Tatmadaw. There are also certain long-term impacts, such as declining vaccination rates for children under six, which could increase public health crises, including infectious diseases like malaria. These crises, including the humanitarian deficit and public health concerns, are likely to persist for three to five years, demanding long-term international commitment. Myanmar’s situation therefore requires sustained global engagement.
The DWB Perspective
DWB also highlighted the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Myanmar, with conflict intensifying and the weather increasing deprivation and socioeconomic challenges. Myanmar’s entrenched regime could collapse suddenly, similar to other recent political upheavals. Conflicts in regions like Kachin and Rakhine are escalating. Despite China’s efforts to de-escalate some conflicts, the Tatmadaw continues to lose ground. China’s perceived recent support for the junta is concerning, as it could alter the momentum against the Tatmadaw and potentially shift conflict to central Myanmar. Myanmar’s trajectory suggests a protracted loss of control by the Tatmadaw, with implications for regional stability. The viability of reconciliation or elections under the 2008 Constitution is questionable, and there is a need for a transition framework and a debate on Myanmar’s future governance. China’s intentions also raise critical questions, particularly the reports of joint security efforts to protect its economic interests, which could entangle China in Myanmar’s internal conflicts. International interest, particularly from the US, has otherwise been tepid, although this could potentially shift under different US leadership. The importance of a long-term, strategic approach to address Myanmar’s evolving crisis cannot be overstated.
On the diplomatic front, there is a lack of progress with ASEAN’s five-point consensus, which calls into question its relevance and suggests a potential need for recalibration. Progress at the UN has also been limited, especially considering the obstacles faced by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy and the divided opinions within the Security Council that hinder consensus. Among Myanmar’s opposition, there is broad rejection of the State Administrative Council, but views on governance are fragmented. While decentralisation and regional autonomy are widely supported, details about the relationship between central and regional governments remain unresolved. It is important to prepare for post-conflict governance, as regime changes often lead to instability, hindering political, economic, and social progress. In these challenging times, open and frank discussion is to be encouraged, and diverse insights are to be valued over official positions. Informal, dialogue-driven approaches—such as those championed by DWB—where specific topics can be discussed collaboratively, have an important role to play.
The CDGA Perspective
CDGA outlined four points on Myanmar’s significance and challenges. Firstly, Myanmar is vital for China due to the Belt and Road Initiative, the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor, and access to the Bay of Bengal. It also impacts Sino–Indian relations and serves as a case study for potential state failure due to ethnic fragmentation and foreign interference. Additionally, Myanmar serves as a test for ASEAN’s ability to mediate and maintain regional stability. Secondly, although the Tatmadaw appears stable in central regions, its governance methods—extortion, draconian control, and mismanagement—make it a destabilising force. It is questionable whether supporting the regime as a ‘lesser evil’ is a viable path to regional peace, considering its internal divisions and oppressive policies. Thirdly, the splintering among opposition forces complicates peace efforts. Groups like the Arakan Army and Kachin State factions pursue ethno-nationalistic goals, hindering the formation of a multiethnic state. It is crucial to include diverse actors, including the NUG, in peace negotiations. Lastly, as regards the path forward, elections may seem ideal but are likely to face violence and interference, undermining their legitimacy. Instead, intermediate solutions involving regional actors like China are essential, focusing on humanitarian aid and structured, enforceable peace negotiations. There is a need for credible enforcement mechanisms in peace processes to avoid ineffective dialogue.
In a further point, Myanmar’s social, ethnic, religious, and historical complexities and conflicts are often not adequately addressed. These internal differences among the many interested parties must be resolved; elections are just a first step and must be framed within the broader context of the Constitution, which gives the military a dominant place in the affairs and the conduct of government. Myanmar ought to work out a system of government which, in such a complex society, means a system that includes and takes account of the diverse communities and internal dynamics. The Constitution should be seen as the end, not the beginning, of the process, but there is need for extensive groundwork before formal governance structures can be established. Finally, CDGA expressed interest in understanding the perspectives of Chinese colleagues regarding the future of Myanmar, especially in terms of the resolution of the situation. There is potential for dialogue on various issues, particularly humanitarian concerns and the spillover of the crisis into neighbouring countries.
After the Elections: Myanmar’s Future Direction and the Role of China
Discussion Summary
Date: 30 June 2026
Location: Zoom
DWB Participants
Alan Doss (former Under Secretary General of the United Nations and former President of the Kofi Annan Foundation; Convenor of the Myanmar Interest Group at DWB; former Chair of the CDGA Advisory Board; Meeting Moderator)
Nicholas Coppel (former Australian Ambassador to Myanmar; Member of the Myanmar Interest Group at DWB)
Clem McCartney (Chair of Conflict Resolution Working Group at DWB)
Gautam Mukhopadhaya (former Indian Ambassador to Myanmar; Member of the Myanmar Interest Group at DWB)
CDGA Participants
Brian Wong (HKU-100 Assistant Professor at HKU; Fellow at CDGA)
Overview of the Discussion
This discussion brought together scholars, former diplomats, and practitioners from China and Europe to exchange views on the evolving situation in Myanmar. Participants discussed the implications of Myanmar’s post-election political landscape, China’s role in promoting stability, prospects for peace, humanitarian concerns, regional diplomacy, and possible areas for future international cooperation. While participants held differing assessments of China’s influence and Myanmar’s political trajectory, there was broad agreement that the conflict has become increasingly fragmented, that no military solution is likely to produce lasting peace, and that any sustainable settlement must ultimately be driven by Myanmar’s own political actors, with external partners playing a supporting role.
Opening Framework and Myanmar’s Changing Political Landscape
The discussion opened by noting that, in the eighteen months since the previous meeting, the situation in Myanmar had changed significantly, although many developments had been negative. The current meeting centred on several key questions:
- How does China define ‘stability’ in Myanmar?
- Is China’s current approach sufficient to achieve long-term stability?
- Could China play a broader role in facilitating an inclusive political settlement?
- What forms of cooperation between China and international partners might realistically be possible?
The discussion then turned to Myanmar following the recent elections, which have not achieved broad international recognition, but which have provided Min Aung Hlaing with a degree of domestic political legitimacy, and have been viewed as an attempt by the military government to normalise its position both domestically and internationally. Moreover, external dynamics have shifted considerably. In particular, the return of the Trump administration was expected to produce a more transactional US approach to Myanmar, driven increasingly by strategic competition with China and access to rare earth minerals rather than democracy promotion alone. This changing geopolitical context, as argued by CDGA participants, could significantly reshape Myanmar’s international environment.
China’s Understanding of Stability and the Limits of China’s Influence
One of the central topics of the discussion concerned differing understandings of ‘stability’. Mainland Chinese participants noted that China’s concept of stability is fundamentally different from the Western conception: rather than seeking the elimination of all conflict, China seeks ‘threshold stability’—preventing instability from crossing levels that threaten China’s interests. In practice this means preventing:
- major refugee flows into China;
- cyber scam networks and transnational crime;
- disruptions along the Yunnan border;
- humanitarian crises that spill across the frontier.
Limited, low-intensity conflict may still remain manageable if these threshold conditions are maintained. Stability, therefore, rests more on maintaining control than eliminating conflict entirely. In this context, Myanmar appears less as a strategic prize for China than as a strategic risk requiring management. Rather than viewing Myanmar primarily through the lens of great-power competition, Beijing is principally concerned with managing instability along its border.
Another recurring theme throughout the discussion was the extent of China’s influence over developments in Myanmar. As Mainland Chinese participants pointed out, Western observers often overestimate China’s leverage. While China remains Myanmar’s most important neighbour, Myanmar remains a sovereign country whose future depends primarily on internal political dynamics rather than external intervention. Indeed, Myanmar’s political landscape has become more fragmented than ever before, and with multiple ethnic armed organisations, People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), the National Unity Government (NUG), and the Tatmadaw all exercising influence over different territories, no external actor—including China—has sufficient leverage to impose a settlement. China’s role should therefore be understood as encouraging and facilitating dialogue where possible rather than resolving the conflict itself or attempting to determine political outcomes inside Myanmar.
Internal Challenges to Resolution
The discussion generally identified Myanmar’s fragmentation as the principal obstacle to peace. Mainland Chinese participants considered it likely that China will continue engaging multiple parties, but the country’s political fragmentation makes comprehensive peace extremely difficult. The new government’s proposed peace process is also fraught with difficulty, as negotiations continue to rely upon the 2008 Constitution, which remains unacceptable to many opposition groups. Deep disagreements over federalism, natural resources, political authority and governance further reduce prospects for meaningful short-term progress.
Furthermore, DWB participants questioned whether Myanmar’s leadership possesses the capacity to govern effectively even if military control expands. Min Aung Hlaing’s government appears focused primarily on coercion rather than governance, and it remains unclear whether it has the capacity to manage the economy, conduct political dialogue, build cooperation among stakeholders, or address broader national challenges. Even a military victory would not necessarily resolve Myanmar’s underlying governance problems. Rather, durable stability would ultimately require internal political consensus rather than continued military confrontation.
Mediation and Humanitarian Concerns
Mainland Chinese participants observed that, despite many meetings and initiatives, Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogue mechanisms have resulted in relatively little tangible progress in Myanmar, and better coordination among these initiatives is necessary. On the other hand, many peace processes fail because parties engage in ‘forum shopping’, moving between different mediators when negotiations become difficult. In this respect, DWB participants highlighted China’s unique position. Unlike many external actors, China possesses both geographical proximity and substantial political influence. The question, therefore, is whether China might eventually move beyond selective stabilisation toward facilitating a broader and more inclusive international framework supporting dialogue among Myanmar’s political actors. China possesses significant leverage, but views differed over whether Beijing is willing—or should be expected—to assume such an expanded diplomatic role.
Humanitarian issues received significant attention during the later stages of the discussion. CDGA participants suggested exploring humanitarian corridors into Rakhine State involving cooperation between China, Bangladesh and India, as the changing political situation in Bangladesh might create opportunities for practical humanitarian cooperation despite broader political disagreements. On the other hand, as reminded by Mainland Chinese participants, Rakhine poses a distinct strategic challenge since, unlike in many other parts of Myanmar, the Arakan Army continues to gain territory there. Consequently, conflict in Rakhine can be expected to continue, worsening humanitarian conditions and creating significant governance challenges with implications not only for China but also Bangladesh and India.
Transnational crime was also addressed, especially cyber scam networks operating near Myanmar’s borders. Since both China and the European Union share strong interests in suppressing trafficking, cybercrime and organised criminal networks, this could become an area of practical cooperation despite wider political differences.
China–EU Cooperation, ASEAN and Youth Engagement
Previous discussions had suggested that effective cooperation between China and the European Union regarding Myanmar would be difficult because they approach Myanmar from different political perspectives. However, since both sides ultimately seek a stable and peaceful Myanmar, Mainland Chinese participants turned to considering practical, incremental areas for collaboration despite these differences. Several potential areas emerged, including humanitarian assistance, anti-trafficking efforts, border security, and support for dialogue. Relatedly, reports that Myanmar’s parliament was reviewing ASEAN’s Five–Point Consensus following the elections could prove an important development for future ASEAN–Myanmar relations and regional diplomacy more broadly.
Longer-term stability in Myanmar also requires strengthening educational exchanges and people-to-people engagement. As Western funding declines, China could increase educational cooperation, economic engagement, and youth exchanges as part of a broader regional responsibility. Understanding Myanmar’s younger generation will remain important, while acknowledging the continuing political significance of the military.
Closing Reflections
The discussion ultimately returned to the central dilemma: the principal challenge is not whether outsiders can solve Myanmar’s problems, but how Myanmar’s own political actors can be encouraged to begin talking to one another. Both the military and the opposition remain reluctant to engage because each fears that dialogue would legitimise the other. As long as this political stalemate persists, military confrontation alone is unlikely to produce a durable settlement. External actors—including China, ASEAN, the European Union and others—cannot replace Myanmar’s own political will, but they may be able to encourage conditions that eventually make dialogue possible.