A shorter version of this article was first published by the South China Morning Post.
In 1793, Lord George Macartney led a British embassy to China in an attempt to secure favourable trade and diplomatic relations for the United Kingdom. Macartney was received by the Chinese Emperor, Qianlong, who famously declared, ‘Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders.’ However, this imperial confidence was misplaced and failed to comprehend Western economic dynamism that was profoundly shifting the contours of the world economy.
In the years that followed that ill-fated encounter, Anglo-Sino relations grew increasingly hostile as Britain sought to redress its trading deficit by forcing China to import opium from British India. Other European powers and Japan also sought to impose favourable trading regimes and territorial enclaves, ushering in what today China refers to as the “century of humiliation.”
Two centuries later, in 1996, the best-seller China Can Say No, co-authored by a group of Chinese intellectuals, reflected a nascent rejection of ‘Western worship’ and a rise in Chinese nationalism. Thirty years on, China is no longer merely saying ‘no’ to the West; it possesses the strategic leverage to hit back, underpinned by its dominance or advantages in global supply chains, rare earth minerals, and critical green technologies.
China’s ‘New Confidence’ is most evident in its forceful countermeasures against Western claims and sanctions. Only a few years ago, when the United States targeted Chinese tech giants like Huawei and TikTok and imposed export controls on advanced semiconductor chips and relevant equipment, Beijing’s reaction was largely rhetorical. However, this has changed significantly. Following the Trump administration’s announcement of sweeping tariffs last April, China was the only nation that imposed comprehensive tit-for-tat tariffs on the US. Furthermore, China has introduced export restrictions on rare earth minerals for military use—a move that includes Beijing’s first assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction.
The West has certainly felt the impact of China’s ascent. In the words of British Prime Minister Kier Starmer, ‘For years the narrative ran that China was the coming power. Well now it has arrived.’ Similarly, during the 2026 Davos Forum, German chancellor Friedrich Merz acknowledged that China has utilised ‘strategic foresight’ to work its way into the ranks of ‘great powers’. Such realisation has been accompanied by a shift in the West’s engagement with China. In recent months, a parade of heads of Western governments , including leaders from France, Germany, Canada, the UK and the US, have visited Beijing. Notably, several of these visits marked the first by a government or state leader from the UK, Canada and the US in nearly a decade, showing Western leaders’ fear of missing opportunities within the world’s second-largest economy.
However, this economic engagement is at odds with the West’s prevailing security narrative, which continues to frame China as a ‘threat’. The US officially defines China as an ‘adversary’. The European Union continues to stick to its ‘triple definition’ of China as a partner, a competitor, and a ‘systemic rival’. In the UK, Starmer has echoed this tension, claiming that China poses ‘security threats’.
The West’s ambivalent approach towards China—treating China as a vital economic engine while branding it a geopolitical rival that must be ‘contained’ —is an increasingly questionable proposition. This is because China’s growing confidence is grounded on its success in developing three critical pillars of national power: economic growth, technological innovation, and military modernisation.
On the economic front, China remains the world’s primary manufacturing hub, accounting for approximately thirty percent of total global manufacturing added value. On technology, China leads the world in terms of scientific publishing in 66 out of 74 critical technologies, including robotics, electric batteries, generative AI, and drones, with the US leading the other 8 technologies. While leading in scientific publications does not automatically translate to technology advantages, it does demonstrate China’s strength or potential in those critical technologies. On military might, as German Chancellor Merz observed during this year’s Munich Security Conference, in the foreseeable future, Beijing could be on an equal footing with the US in military terms.
Meanwhile, China has been reducing its reliance on the West for years and aims to achieve self-sufficiency across a range of critical technologies including semiconductor chips. China is also deepening ties with the non-Western world. It is the largest trading partner for over 120 countries and ranks among the top three for 157 nations, demonstrating its extensive global reach. By 2025, China’s trade surplus reached a record $1.2 trillion. This trade surplus has produced a backlash with the West accusing China of pursuing a mercantilist policy (and currency manipulation), claims that has been levelled in the past against Japan, and, more recently, against the United States under the Trump presidency.
Since containment is not a viable strategy, what is the alternative for the West as it faces a confident China? We suggest three areas where the West should engage with China to help build trust and to avoid, as President Xi Jinping recently cautioned, the so-called Thucydides Trap, which posits the risk of conflict between established and emerging powers.
First, the West must move beyond a reluctant acknowledgment of China’s rise towards a genuine acceptance of this reality. This requires recognising that China—or indeed any nation—has an inherent right to develop and, potentially, surpass Western powers in peaceful competition. Western powers should recognise that the West’s political and economic dominance following the Industrial Revolution and modernisation is a relatively recent chapter in human history. China had long been the richest country in the world before being surpassed by the West, a shifting dynamic which was acknowledged by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations.
In more recent times, we should not forget that Western nations were eager for China to join the World Trade Organisation. It did so despite the reluctance of members of the Chinese leadership who feared for the country’s autonomy in critical sectors like banking and agriculture.
Second,the West needs better to understand China’s strategic thinking and its society. Western security officials are often sceptical about Beijing’s stated preference for a multipolar world over global hegemony. Ironically, however, it is President Trump’s apparent enthusiasm for spheres of influence that seems to support that narrative. In reality, China maintains only one overseas military base (in Djibouti), which is a stark contrast to the (at least) 128 U.S. bases in 51 countries (excluding hundreds of temporary bases) and the significant global military presence of the UK and France. Moreover, China has not engaged directly in an overseas war for over four decades, whereas Western countries have been involved in numerous conflicts during the same period.
China is indeed building a powerful military that can deter foreign interference in its domestic affairs as well as project force outside of the mainland if required. There is no doubt that Beijing aims to secure unification with Taiwan and it has not renounced the possible use of force to do so. But several Western countries also face challenges of regional autonomy and separatism within their borders and should therefore be sensitive to China’s position even though they do not endorse it.
Additionally, the West should realise that for the Chinese government the ultimate priority is domestic legitimacy, which is dependent on improving living standards and maintaining social stability. However, Western media often portrays China through an occluded lens that does not capture the enormous social progress of recent decades reflected in better health, educational opportunity, and safe and clean cities equipped with advanced infrastructure where people are generally enjoying a higher quality of life and leisure than a generation ago.
Last, the West must not assume that its political system is the sole universal standard. Western narratives about ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ have been characterized and dismissed by Chinese commentators as hypocritical and self-serving rhetoric. Many Chinese feel that the West has forfeited its moral high ground and is in no position to lecture others. Decades of Western-led interventions and wars in countries like Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan have resulted in systemic suffering rather than flourishing democracies.
While China faces its own challenges and problems, such as environmental pollution and limited avenues for political expressions, most Chinese people believe that these are internal issues to be solved by themselves. History suggests that meaningful progress must emerge from within a society, and foreign interventions have seldom produced stable societies.
In a nutshell, for the West, a confident China is not a problem to be solved or a ‘threat’ to be contained, but a global reality to be navigated with wisdom, pragmatism and respect.